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Michael Horowitz

Despite deterrent effects, risks of automated nuclear weapons systems are too high

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Amid heightened global instability, including among nuclear powers, the role of AI in nuclear weapons system remains a subject of debate. In a new piece in War on the Rocks, Joshua Schwartz and CERL Affiliated Faculty Member Michael Horowitz argue that while automated nuclear weapons systems could improve credible deterrence, their risks outweigh their rewards. Discussing both the theory behind such systems and their own research about automated systems’ deterrent effects, the two outline several key ways that NATO states can reduce incentives for automation in the nuclear realm.

Michael C. Horowitz is Director of Perry World House and Richard Perry Professor at the University of Pennsylvania. He is also a member of CERL’s Affiliated Faculty. Read his bio here.

The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of any organization or university.

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Despite deterrent effects, risks of automated nuclear weapons systems are too high