Precision Lethality and Civilian Harm Mitigation

In a time when military strategy is closely tied to public opinion, technological progress, and the evolving landscape of conflict, the United States and its allies stand at a crucial juncture. The Secretary of Defense’s decision to scale back the CHMR-AP and its associated CP CoE marks a dramatic shift in how the Department of Defense (DoD) addresses civilian harm in warfare.

While some may view this decision as a necessary step toward cutting costs, enhancing military efficiency, and increasing battlefield lethality, it has sparked a fierce debate among experts. This raises critical concerns about the long-term implications of abandoning the bipartisan commitment in Congress to civilian harm mitigation that has developed over the past decade and the nearly uniform endorsement of combatant commanders. Opponents argue that the imperative to mitigate unintended casualties transcends moral obligations; it is essential for strategic success. The relationship between precision lethality and civilian protection is not a contradiction. Civilian harm mitigation boosts operational effectiveness, secures legitimacy, and reinforces national security.

A military strategy that prioritizes lethality without precision and the ability to inflict harm without civilian casualty mitigation introduces significant operational, economic, social, and reputational costs on the U.S. military and their allies, extending far beyond immediate battlefield losses. It is about more than just wasted resources and operational failures; it leads to prolonged conflicts, strained diplomatic relations, and ultimately contributes to the radicalization of the civilian population. The experiences of the United States military in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria highlight this reality. Historical evidence clearly shows that miscalculated strikes have not only generated resentment but have also strengthened insurgent recruitment.

The best evidence and research available consistently indicate that precision in military operations correlates with greater civilian acceptance of military operations and more favorable strategic outcomes. The reduction of civilian harm mitigation efforts signals a troubling departure from these critical lessons, raising urgent concerns about the United States’ ability to navigate the next generation of warfare, where adversaries adeptly weaponize disinformation and public perception alongside conventional military power.

Key questions: What are the benefits of an enhanced lethality approach to U.S. interests overall? Is civilian harm mitigation a moral imperative in war over and above the requirements of LOAC? How does this approach go beyond the requirements of LOAC, and are there concerns about imposing additional legal burdens? Are there moral or strategic reasons that weigh against such an approach?

U.S. adversaries increasingly seek to undermine traditional military responses by situating their operations near civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and refugee centers. While there may be ongoing debates regarding the extent of civilian involvement as human shields, the international community largely agrees that this tactic has been a common tactic of rogue states and terrorist organizations.

Under LOAC, we must examine the status of civilians used as human shields by these entities. International humanitarian law recognizes differences between voluntary and involuntary human shields, and this difference lies in issues of agency and coercion. Voluntary human shields are individuals who actively choose to shield military objectives, often through non-violent means, to prevent attacks. This includes proximate human shields. There are those who become shields simply due to their proximity to a legitimate target, without any active participation. Involuntary human shields, on the other hand, are coerced by belligerents to shield military targets, lacking the ability to make a choice.

Under the law, the legal status and protections of individuals identified as voluntary shields during armed conflict differ greatly from the status of involuntary and proximate human shields. The consequences of this difference are crucial for analyzing the ethical, policy, and legal implications of human shielding tactics in warfare. This is key when examining subterranean warfare, particularly when the tunnels lie under dense civilian areas and the cities become massive human shielding operations. Is the entire tunnel system in Gaza one large human shielding operation? How do we define human shielding and what are its consequences for the law of armed conflict? Most importantly, how should commanders think about mitigating civilian harm when the very physical infrastructure of the battlefield uses civilians as shields? Additionally, it is vital to consider the implications of civilian facilities, such as hospitals, that are exploited as command-and-control centers by terrorist groups. How should commanders mitigate civilian harm when the enemy uses immune and protected sites to shield their military operations?

Learning from U.S. military operations against ISIS and similar organizations, as well as more recent operations, can provide essential insights in addressing these challenges effectively. By understanding these dynamics, we can develop strategies that uphold our commitment to protecting civilians while countering terrorism decisively.

Key questions: When are human shields targetable in armed conflict as individuals who are participating in hostilities? Are all voluntary human shields targetable as co-belligerents? Are there degrees of human shielding, some of which make civilians targetable and some of which do not cross the threshold? And beyond that, is there a difference between different types of shielding, some of which are more active and would subject a civilian to a co-belligerency assessment. Does the domestic law of self-defense assist us in developing a framework for dealing with voluntary human shields in war? What can militaries do to mitigate harm to civilians when they are used as human shields, and how do mitigation steps give commanders additional options beyond the more traditional tools of armed conflict?

The debate about human shielding opens the door to the question of how to assess levels of civilian harm in war. Some reports alleged a staggering 3,977 civilian casualties from airstrikes in Afghanistan between 2016 and 2020.2 In the past three years, Russia’s deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine has led to estimates of over 8,000 deaths and 13,000 injuries.

One of the many challenges associated with identifying accurate casualty counts has to do with voluntary and involuntary human shields participating in hostilities. There is an extensive literature about the challenges of casualty reporting in the war between Israel and Hamas, and yet mainstream media has not identified the very hardest aspect of that debate, having to do with the principle of distinction and whose deaths should count in the final number. Also, the question is how the data should be arranged and organized. Who is a civilian and who a terrorist? While these figures have been documented, countless civilian deaths in conflict zones still go unreported, highlighting an urgent issue that demands our attention.

Counting war casualties and mitigating civilian harm is not just a moral imperative; it is a critical strategic aspect of war fighting for the U.S. military and its allies. As casualty counts rise, public sentiment may turn against the party inflicting. AI-led initiatives and special operations have shown that addressing the root causes of civilian harm can lead to greater mission success and significantly fewer civilian casualties. Nonetheless, inadequate preparation and ineffective data collection continue to undermine these efforts.

The U.S. GAO issued a report in March 2024 recommending that DoD take actions to enhance its CHMR-AP efforts. Specifically, the GAO report recommended DoD explore the use of a range of estimates of civilian casualties to improve the accuracy of assessments. This recommendation was identified previously in a 2018 Joint Staff report and a 2022 RAND report. This panel will delve further into this recommendation and the recommendation that DoD increases emphasis on information operations to reduce civilian harm. We will explore ways to estimate civilian harm in a military campaign, including how militaries can track civilian harm they cause and how external organizations can estimate combat casualty estimates.

Tracking effectively civilian harm is essential for ongoing operational learning and adaptation. It is imperative for researchers to rigorously evaluate the standards, processes, procedures, and policies in place for counting civilian casualties. Adopting these measures will not only enhance accountability but also ensure that we protect innocent lives in future conflicts.

Key questions: How should the international community develop methodologies to measure civilian harm in conflict? What are some objective metrics for assessing civilian casualties? Can computer modeling and the use of AI assist with providing accurate casualty data? How can militaries use civilian harm data to inform effectiveness, weapon system performance, and success of mitigation efforts?

Dense urban warfare, characterized by intricate tunnel networks and a significant presence of civilians above ground, poses serious legal and operational challenges that must be addressed.

The necessity of eliminating an enemy in such contexts is inextricably linked to the potential for substantial civilian casualties. Establishing a humanitarian safe zone and effectively delivering humanitarian aid in these conditions are both critical yet exceptionally challenging. Similarly, there is the inevitable question of what happens when one of the fighting parties’ exercises controls over the borders through which third parties can reach civilian populations in the war zone. Is failure to open borders to third-party aid a war crime? When is there a duty to permit third-party indiscriminate control of the aid, and, in some instances, to take possession of the international aid delivered to the population?

Key questions: In light of these complexities, how can the military accurately assess proportionality? Is it feasible to conduct urban warfare while adhering to the principles of proportionality and distinction as outlined in LOAC? More importantly, can the objective of neutralizing an enemy in dense urban environments align with the essential responsibility to mitigate civilian harm? Can the failure to permit third-party aid delivery constitute genocide? These questions are vital for ensuring that military objectives do not compromise humanitarian values.

It is crucial that journalists and media outlets cover wars, yet it is nearly impossible to ensure they can do so safely. Under LOAC, journalists have the same basic protection as ordinary civilians (See Article 50, Geneva Conventions, and 79 of Protocol I). Protocol I makes clear that journalists do not lose their civilian status by virtue of being embedded with a military force in a war zone. Embedded journalists wear “press” insignia to identify and protect their civilian status. It is often thought that such insignia establish immunity under LOAC, but this is not correct. A press badge or vest merely serves to remind all parties that the press are civilians and cannot be targeted as such.

Yet members of the press lose that civilian status and abuse their press protection when they participate in hostilities. Thus, if a member of the press embedded with a military force assists that force in combat, they will count as “civilians participating in hostilities” and will become targetable. The war in Gaza presented such instances, in which local journalists had both participated in active hostilities and had assisted in guarding hostages.

As discussed in the session on human shielding, identifying who should count as a journalist in such instances is a tricky and complex matter. Two things can be true at once: an individual can be a functioning journalist and can be participating in hostilities. They may be validly targetable under such circumstances, but reporting will identify them as journalists who are targeted. It is critical to bring clarity to the status of journalists in war to ensure that press protection is not misused and to ensure accuracy in reporting about journalist casualty counts. Among other reasons, individuals who misuse their press status endanger journalists in war everywhere and weaken the ability to protect the access of journalists to active battlefields.

Key questions: Should journalists receive only the protection of civilians in war? Or should they receive “immunity,” like medical personnel, clerics or soldiers who are “hors de combat?” Or are these effectively the same? When should journalists be considered as civilians participating in hostilities? Beyond the case of journalists, there are questions about the duty of distinction among those engaging in combat. Is the use of disguises permitted in armed conflict? What about in asymmetric conflict when a state military is fighting a non-state military that refuses to self-identify? Are international armed conflicts (IACs) different from non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) with regard to the obligation to self-identify, and hence with regard to the use of disguises? What about in low-intensity conflict where intelligence operations blend into kinetic activity, often seamlessly? When does a covert lethal operation run by civilian intelligence forces count as perfidy for purposes of armed conflict?

The rapid advancement of AI and autonomous military technologies highlights the critical need to strengthen and expand efforts for mitigating civilian harm. Research shows that AI-based targeting systems have the potential to reduce civilian casualties while enhancing target accuracy. As smart munitions optimize precision in urban warfare, AI-assisted geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) offers vital real-time tracking of movements and uses advanced facial recognition to improve targeting efficiency.

Modern AI-driven targeting systems, coupled with predictive analytics and unmanned combat platforms, are redefining precision in military operations. These innovations reduce errors and enhance situational awareness. For instance, facial recognition integrated into drone warfare systems has significantly improved the identification of combatants, thereby decreasing the risk of misidentification. However, the ethical and strategic application of these technologies demands stringent oversight, continuous data-driven refinement, and a proactive assessment of potential unintended consequences.

Without the CHMR-AP’s CP CoE and the preservation of key institutional frameworks, the United States faces the risk of lagging behind in best practices for AI integration in combat. This gap could give adversaries the upper hand, enabling them to exploit weaknesses in legal and ethical compliance. Focusing on civilian harm mitigation not only advances important policy goals but also it provides an opportunity to explore new horizons in harnessing technology in service of those goals.

Key questions: How can the United States and its allies harness the benefits of AI for the purpose of mitigating civilian harm? Does civilian harm mitigation provide an opportunity to develop advanced technologies that have not yet been explored for purposes of advancing precision targeting and improving intelligence support for lethal operations? How can the United States and its allies cooperate and coordinate on AI advancement to ensure alignment of interests under a civilian harm mitigation regime? Is there a place for advanced robotics on the battlefield to not only mitigate civilian harm but also offer force protection? Would the same technology serve both purposes? What specific challenges discussed here in this conference could be addressed using AI?

In this session, the goal is to make recommendations to reassess and reimagine the role of the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) and what the U.S. government and military can do in this space. Participants will break into small groups to conduct practical policy exercises relating to one of the topics listed above. Such exercises might consist of drafting legislation, conducting a mock negotiation session, or drafting principles for civilian harm mitigation or guidelines for combatant commanders. Group spokespersons will share the conclusions of the group in the second half of the session for discussion with all workshop participants. Final policy recommendations will be reflected in the post-conference briefing paper.