CENTER FOR ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW​

Left of Launch: Communications and Threat Escalation in a Nuclear Age

April 21 -
 23, 2021

Co-sponsored By:

The Conference


Several decades after the end of the Cold War, the world’s nuclear superpowers still struggle to understand the role that amorphous theories of “deterrence” and large, capable nuclear arsenals play in forestalling nuclear war. In furtherance of the status quo, the United States continues to build up its nuclear triad despite the apocalyptic levels of destruction the use of such weapons would entail. Recent rhetoric of some state leaders has reawakened concern over the potentially catastrophic consequences of maintaining a nuclear arsenal. These communications highlight the multi-layered nature of strategic dialogue. Such comments send numerous, and sometimes conflicting signals to adversaries and allies alike. That same rhetoric has also revived questions about the propriety of leaders issuing threats. Is it ever legal to use nuclear weapons in a first strike capacity? If first use of nuclear weapons is not legal, is it legal to threaten to do so? In other words, is it legal to threaten to take action which, itself, a sovereign may not legally take? Once such threats are issued, does the recipient have the right to respond in self-defense? Such concerns have only been amplified by the contentious tone employed by current leaders.

Those committed to preventing, mitigating, and resolving the most violent of conflicts have, traditionally, been able to leverage international cooperation under the rule of law. Unfortunately, recent examples in conflict escalation (both rhetorical and actual) have left many to wonder what role international law plays in fashioning a pathway for peace. Adding to the tension of the modern age is the difficulty of determining the legality of nuclear threats. Do the traditional methods of analyzing a state’s compliance with Articles 2(4), and 51 of the U.N. Charter apply in the context of threat-making, especially when those threats explicitly or implicitly implicate the use of nuclear weapons? Does the inherent right of self-defense include the right to use nuclear weapons? In short, is nuclear war so different from other forms of warfare that traditional legal doctrines no longer apply, or must they be applied in substantially different ways?

The issues at play in the current nuclear dialogue engage classic debates about threat issuance, self-defense, and preemptive strikes. Does international law continue to shape the boundaries of nuclear policy and strategy, or is the world beginning to fall back into a Cold War paradigm? Complicating the current strategy is the emergence of totalitarian regimes and non-state actors pursuing nuclear weapons with zealous vigor. What does the expanding set of complications portend for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament? Given the current state of rhetoric by sovereign leaders, are such laudable goals even within the realm of the possible? In sum, what roles will strategic communications and the rule of law play in de-escalating nuclear tensions?

Schedule

Register for the Keynote

Wednesday, April 21

4:00 pm – 6:00 pm

Rethinking U.S. and International Nuclear Policies: Are Current Practices Including Threats of Nuclear Strikes Legal and Morally Justified?

Public Keynote Panel Moderated by Professor Claire Finkelstein
Panelists: Brigadier General R. Patrick HustonCongressman Adam Smith, Dr. John Harvey and Dr. Amy Nelson

This keynote event brings together senior level experts to discuss nuclear weaponry and policy concerns in light of sovereign leaders’ rhetoric, the efficacy of current Law of War principles to constrain such communications, and the need to rethink the rule of law’s role for establishing enforceable boundaries for states and non-state actors who issue nuclear weaponry-related threats.

Those committed to preventing, mitigating, and resolving the most violent of conflicts have traditionally leveraged international cooperation based on adherence to the rule of law. But recent examples in conflict escalation (both rhetorical and actual) have left many to wonder what role international law plays in regulating the use of nuclear weapons. Adding to this tension is the difficulty of determining the legality of nuclear threats. Senior-level nuclear policy experts will answer the questions:

  • Do the traditional methods of analyzing a State’s compliance with Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter apply in the context of threat-making when those threats explicitly or implicitly implicate the use of nuclear weapons?
  • Does the inherent right of self-defense include the right to use nuclear weapons?
  • Is nuclear war so different from other forms of warfare that traditional legal doctrines no longer apply, or must they be applied in substantially different ways?

    Additionally, the emergence of totalitarian regimes and non-State actors pursuing nuclear weapons complicates the strategy. Panelists will discuss their views on these questions and more:
  • What does the expanding set of complications portend for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament?
  • Given the current state of rhetoric by leaders of nuclear sovereigns, are such goals even within the realm of possibility?
  • What roles will strategic communications and the rule of law play in de-escalating nuclear tensions?

Thursday, April 22

9:15 am – 9:30 am

Welcoming Remarks

9:30 am – 10:45 am


Session 1: Current Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Capability

Moderator: Major Ryan Fisher 

Current nuclear policy and the doctrine of deterrence was developed in the crucible of conventional warfare. Session 1 will examine whether there is a tension among the concepts of preemption, anticipatory self-defense, and nuclear deterrence as the default doctrine in an age where the legality of nuclear weapons is increasingly uncertain. The discussion will begin with a review of U.S. nuclear policy and capabilities. It will include an examination of the U.S.’s stated goal of nuclear deterrence and whether this conflicts with a nuclear arsenal that appears structured for first-strike capabilities. The discussion will also explore whether current U.S. policy needs revision for philosophical or efficacy-based reasons and whether other policy options might better satisfy U.S. strategic ends. Does the use of nuclear weapons follow the same legal analysis as its contemporary counterparts? Does the analysis fall short when it comes to nuclear weapons? Should the analysis or the underlying rules change? The answers to these questions will involve discussions of applicable international humanitarian law, the 1996 opinion by the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, and the recently-enacted U.N. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.


10:45 am – 11:00 am  Break


11:00 am – 12:30 pm

Session 2: Determining the Rules-Based Order with Respect to Threats to Use Force and Anticipatory Self-Defense

Moderator: Prof. Charles Moxley 

The law of armed conflict recognizes that sovereign states possess the inherent right to use force to defend themselves against certain acts perpetrated by others. The “acts” which may trigger invocation of the right of self-defense may include threats to use force. This right of self-defense also extends, in some cases, to the right to anticipate an attack and act in advance of the attack – though how much in advance remains an issue of contention. Session 2 will focus on the legal predicate of the authority of states to issue threats and, when threatened, to respond in self-defense from both a domestic and an international law perspective. Domestically, does a president have the authority to threaten other sovereigns unilaterally? Is it permissible for a president to threaten to take actions that are not legally permissible for the president to unilaterally direct? Do such threats constitute acts of war? If so, must the president comply with the War Powers Resolution after making the threats? Under international law, does threat-making comply with Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter? Is it possible for nations, acting pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, to create the conditions for their defense, thereby opening the door to anticipatory military strikes? These are just a few of the questions that this session will tackle in the hopes of achieving greater clarity in this enigmatic but pressing area of international law.


12:30 – 2:00 pm Break


2:15 pm – 3:15 pm

Session 3: Nuclear Weapons as a Form of Strategic Communication

Moderator: Prof. Michael Horowitz

The size of nuclear arsenals, the positioning of nuclear weapons, and the intricate wording of policy pronouncements have as much to do with internal military readiness as they do with a state sending deliberate signals to their adversaries. This “signaling” aspect of nuclear weapons and policy is, at its core, a form of communication. The Cuban Missile Crisis serves as the benchmark for these high-stakes, political conversations. Such conversations, of course, are not unbounded. Although it has failed to establish an outright ban on nuclear weapons, international law has been instrumental in shaping the nuclear conversation. The panel members in this session will discuss how nuclear possessor states signal to one another, both in times of relative peace and during periods of crisis. The participants will also address whether this form of communication is effective at promoting the peaceful resolution of disputes, or whether it increases the chances of a deliberate or an inadvertent nuclear crisis. Implicit in this conversation is an exploration of the factors that frustrate the delivery and receipt of an intended message. For example, signals can be inconsistent with other strategic messaging, blocked or occluded by cyber operations, and unintentionally create time pressures that further complicate complex crisis management. The panel will discuss the risks inherent to nuclear signaling, the potential ramifications of allowing states to carry out their strategic communications in an unregulated environment, and the limits that international law should impose in this arena.


Friday, April 23

9:30 am – 11:00 am

Session 4: What Role Does International Law Play in Shaping Nuclear Dialogue, Including the Constraint of Nuclear Threats by Sovereigns?

Moderator: Mr. Jules Zacher 

Technological advances have increased the lethality and efficiency of current weapons systems. Compounding the danger is the fact that advances in technology continue to reduce traditional barriers to entry, thus increasing the likelihood that rogue actors can obtain the means to inflict a high degree of destruction. The speed at which new weapons are being developed severely impacts the ability to create adequate defenses. Moreover, nations are compelled to take increasingly offensive postures as they address their expanding national security concerns. While these developments generally involve conventional weapons, they apply with equal force to nuclear weapons. What role will international law play in managing the complexity of future nuclear communications? Are there other ways for the international community to compel recalcitrant nuclear states to comply with emerging norms? Can law compete with the speed of change, and the intransigence of key actors? What does the withdrawal of leading nations from existing nuclear treaties say about the ability of law to anticipate and manage present and future nuclear communications?

Some of those nuclear communications involve threats. Does current international law, particularly the language of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, prevent the threat of nuclear force to be used as a policy tool? What role might international humanitarian law play in constraining threats to use force when it can be ignored without consequence? Assuming such constraints are enforceable, should the international community even want to circumscribe behavior that might prove beneficial for preventing or mitigating threats to international peace and security? Do nuclear-based threats promote peace and security or do they undermine the global order? What role should non-nuclear actors play in shaping future nuclear conversations? Can the signatories to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons drive the conversation internationally towards a nuclear-free world? Session 4 will examine these issues, with an emphasis on threats in the emerging “new” nuclear age. In particular, the panel members will address the emerging role of social media as a mouthpiece for leaders to issue threats. The panel will discuss the power of social media as a platform for threats in light of the sole authority of many leaders of nuclear possessor states to authorize nuclear strikes. Due attention will also be paid to the vulnerabilities of social media accounts to hacking and the resultant potential for inadvertent escalation of threats to lead to the use of nuclear weapons.


11:00 am – 11:15 am Break


11:15 am – 1:00 pm


Session 5: Other Constraints Within the U.S. Polity

Moderator: Major Justin Ulrich 

Within the United States, the tension between the executive and the legislative branches over the exercise of war powers has evolved throughout U.S. history. The executive branch now plays the dominant role in our system. This panel will examine the practicality of having a Commander-in-Chief who is unfettered by domestic hard law in the ability to issue threats to use force. The panel will discuss the origin and history of the War Powers Resolution and its attempt to reset the balance of war powers between the two political branches. The panel will also examine other constraints that operate within the U.S. political system and discuss whether new political processes are warranted or even wanted. The discussion will also cover the impact that technological advances in the means and methods of warfare will have on the need to constrain unilateral executive action.


1:00 pm – 1:30 pm

Plenary Session on the Products of this Conference and Closing Remarks

Keynotes

Thursday, October 1, 2020


Wednesday April 21st  4:00 pm – 6:00 pm


Rethinking U.S. and International Nuclear Policies: Are Current Practices Including Threats of Nuclear Strikes Legal and Morally Justified?

Public Keynote Panel Moderated by Professor Claire Finkelstein
Panelists: Brigadier General R. Patrick HustonCongressman Adam Smith, Dr. John Harvey and Dr. Amy Nelson

This keynote event brings together senior level experts to discuss nuclear weaponry and policy concerns in light of sovereign leaders’ rhetoric, the efficacy of current Law of War principles to constrain such communications, and the need to rethink the rule of law’s role for establishing enforceable boundaries for states and non-state actors who issue nuclear weaponry-related threats.

Those committed to preventing, mitigating, and resolving the most violent of conflicts have traditionally leveraged international cooperation based on adherence to the rule of law. But recent examples in conflict escalation (both rhetorical and actual) have left many to wonder what role international law plays in regulating the use of nuclear weapons. Adding to this tension is the difficulty of determining the legality of nuclear threats. Senior-level nuclear policy experts will answer the questions:

  • Do the traditional methods of analyzing a State’s compliance with Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter apply in the context of threat-making when those threats explicitly or implicitly implicate the use of nuclear weapons?
  • Does the inherent right of self-defense include the right to use nuclear weapons?
  • Is nuclear war so different from other forms of warfare that traditional legal doctrines no longer apply, or must they be applied in substantially different ways?

    Additionally, the emergence of totalitarian regimes and non-State actors pursuing nuclear weapons complicates the strategy. Panelists will discuss their views on these questions and more:
  • What does the expanding set of complications portend for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament?
  • Given the current state of rhetoric by leaders of nuclear sovereigns, are such goals even within the realm of possibility?
  • What roles will strategic communications and the rule of law play in de-escalating nuclear tensions?

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Participants

Prof. Larry Alexander 

Warren Distinguished Professor of Law; Co-Executive Director, Institute for Law & Religion

Dr. John Burroughs 

Senior Analyst, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

Prof. Stephen Cimbala

Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine

Ms. Julia Ciocca

Research Fellow, Perry World House

Mr. Tom Collina 

Director of Policy, Ploughshares Fund 

Dr. Pierce Corden 

Disarmament Advisor to the Holy See Mission to the UN.

Col. Gail Curley 

Chief, National Security Law Division

Major Gretchen Davenport

Chief, International Law Branch

Prof. John Dehn 

Associate Professor & Faculty Director, National Security & Civil Rights Program, Loyola University Chicago School of Law 

Ms. Naomi Egel

Janne Nolan Nuclear Security Visiting Fellow, Truman Center for National Policy; PhD Candidate, Cornell University

Ms. Arlene Fickler 

Partner, Schnader – CERL Executive Board Member

Prof. Claire Finkelstein, Moderator 

Faculty Director, CERL; Algernon Biddle Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of Carey Law School

Major Ryan Fisher, Moderator 

Professor, National Security Law Department, US Army JAG School

Dr. Christopher Ford

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Department of State

Dr. James Fry 

Associate Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong

LTC. Elisabeth Gilman 

Attorney-Advisor, Political-Military Affairs

Major Cristina Gomez

Strategist, G3/G5/G7 Strategy, Plans & Policy, United States Army

Prof. Kevin Govern 

Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law; CERL Executive Board Member

Prof. Antonia Handler Chayes

Professor of Practice in International Politics and Law at The Fletcher School at Tufts University

Dr. John Harvey

Former Principal – Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs

Prof. Michael Horowitz, Moderator

Director of Perry World House and Richard Perry Professor at the University of Pennsylvania

Mr. Bixler Howland

Bixler W. Howland, P.S.C.

Brigadier General R. Patrick Huston

U.S. Army, Assistant Judge Advocate General for Military Law and Operations

Mr. Christopher Jacobs 

Senior Research Fellow, CERL, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Mr. David Jonas 

Partner, FH+H

Ms. Lauren Kahn 

Research Fellow, Perry World House

Prof. Michael Klare 

PAWSS Professor Emeritus, Hampshire College

Prof. David Koplow

Professor of Law, Georgetown Law 

Prof. Richard Lebow

Professor Of International Political Theory, King’s College London

LTC. Justin Marchesi

Chair, National Security Law Department

Dr. Mark Mattox 

Director of the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Graduate Fellowship Program and a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Mr. Mark “Max” Maxwell

ACJA of Africa Command

Mr. Richard Meyer 

Interim Executive Director, CERL, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Major Kyle Mitchell 

U.S. Army Strategic Command

Prof. Charles Moxley, Moderator

Adjunct Professor of Law, Fordham Law School

Prof. Samuel Moyn

 Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence and Professor of History, Yale Law School

Rev. Brian Muzas

 Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

Ms. Saroj Nair

PhD. Candidate, University of Hong Kong

Dr. Amy Nelson

Research Fellow, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Prof. Mary Ellen O’Connell

Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School

Dr. Pavel Podvig

Senior Researcher, WMDOSW Programme, UNIDIR

Prof. Daryl Press

Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College

Ms. Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker

Dean Emeritus – CERL Executive Board Member

Prof. Dakota Rudesill

Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State Moritz College of Law

Prof. Ronald Rychlak 

Jamie L. Whitten Chair of Law and Government and Professor of Law, The University of Mississippi School of Law 

Prof. Scott Sagan

 Caroline S.G. Munro Memorial Professor in Political Science, Senior Fellow – Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University

Congressman Adam Smith

 U.S. Representative for Washington’s Ninth Congressional District

Ms. Ariana Smith

 Executive Director, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

Prof. Gary Solis

Professor of Law, United States Military Academy

Dr. Jeffrey Taliaferro

Professor of Political Science, Tufts University

Mr. John Tierney 

Executive Director, Council for a Livable World

Ms. Leonor Tomero

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy

Major Justin Ulrich,

ModeratorProfessor, National Security Law Department, US Army JAG School

Mr. Tobias Vestner 

Head of Security Law Programme – GCSP (Geneva Centre for Security Policy)

Col. (Retired) David Wallace

Senior Fellow, West Point Center for the Rule of Law

Dr. Wilfred Wan

Lead Researcher, WMDOSW Programme, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Mr. Allen Weiner 

Director, Stanford Program in International and Comparative Law

Prof. Noah Weisbord 

Associate Professor, Queen’s University, Faculty of Law

Mr. Theo Wilson 

Law Student, Former CERL intern

Mr. Jules Zacher,

ModeratorLawyer, CERL Executive Board Member

Mr. Peter Zimmerman

 Contributer, US News & World Report, Nuclear Physicist

Background Readings

Books & Chapters

Allen Buchanan, Justifying Preventive War, Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification (2007) ch. 5.

Anthony Kenny, The Logic of Deterrence (1985) chs. 4-6.

Charles J. Moxley Jr., Nuclear Weapons and International Law in the Post Cold War World, Austin & Winfield (2000).

Claire Finkelstein, Threats and Preemptive Practices, 5 Legal Theory (1999) 311–338.

David Rodin, The Problem with Prevention, Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification (2007) ch. 6.

Edward F. McClennen, Prisoner’s Dilemma and Resolute Choice, in Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation (1985).

John Burroughs, The Legality of Threat Or Use of Nuclear Weapons: A Guide to the Historic Opinion of the International Court of Justice (1998).

John Burroughs & Jennifer Nordstrom, Nuclear Weapons and Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Part I: The International Framework, sec. 1.1-1.4.

Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (2001) ch. 2.

Martin J. Sherwin, Gambling with Armageddon: Nuclear Roulette from Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis (2020).

Richard A. McCormick, Nuclear Deterrence and the Problem of Intentionin Catholics and Nuclear War (1983) 168-182.

Richard Ned Lebow & Janice Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (1994) ch. 14.

Robert Butterworth, Peter Marquez, John Sheldon & Eric Sterner, Returning to Fundamentals: Deterrence and U.S. National Security in the 21st Century, George C. Marshall Institute (2011).

Ruud Van Dijk, Nuclear weapons and the Cold Warin The Routledge Handbook of the Cold War (Artemy M. Kalinovsky & Craig Daigle eds., 2014) 275-291.

Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear Deterrence in a Multipolar World: The U.S., Russia and Security Challenges (2019).

Suzanne Uniacke, On Getting One’s Retaliation in First, Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification (2007) ch. 3.

News Articles, Magazines, Blogs

Adam Mount, The Case Against New Nuclear Weapons, Center for American Progress (May 4, 2017).

Adam Mount & Pranay Vaddi, Better Informing a President’s Decision on Nuclear Use, Lawfare (Nov. 9, 2020).

Al Mauroni, Deterrence: I Don’t Think It Means What You Think It Means, Modern War Institute at West Point (Oct. 8, 2019).

Alex Wellerstein, Nukemap (Version 2.7), The Nuclear Secrecy Blog (2012-2020).

Ariana Smith, Nuclear weapons and the legal norms of non-use and abolition, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (Oct. 13, 2020).

Ben Freeman & Ose Okooboh, Nuclear War Profiteers are Driving the Nukes Debate, The Baraza (Nov. 17, 2020).

Charles Dunlap, Is the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Immoral?, War on the Rocks (Aug. 2, 2017). 

Christopher Ford, Conventional ‘Replacement’ of Nuclear Weapons?, Hudson Institute (Nov. 17, 2020).

Craig S. Smith, A.I. Here, There, Everywhere, The New York Times (Mar. 9, 2021).

Dakota S. Rudesill, Good Governance Paper No. 20: Repairing and Strengthening Norms of Nuclear Restraint, Just Security (Nov. 1, 2020).

Dan Sabbagh, Cap on Trident nuclear warhead stockpile to rise by more than 40%, The Guardian (Mar. 16, 2021).

David P. Barash, Nuclear deterrence is a myth. And a lethal one at that, The Guardian (Jan. 14, 2018).

Gro Nystuen & Kjølv Egeland, A ‘Legal Gap’? Nuclear Weapons Under International Law, Arms Control Association (Mar. 2016).

Jules Zacher & Theo Wilson, July Twitter hack underscores the need to nix ‘sole authority’, The Rule of Law Post (Aug. 19, 2020).

Matthew Waxman, Constitutional Power to Threaten War: Three Points on Syria, Lawfare (Sep. 3, 2013).

Parkha Durrani, Precision Technologies: Replacement to Conventional Weapons? Modern Diplomacy (Jul. 21, 2020).

Pete McKenzie, America’s Allies Are Becoming a Nuclear-Proliferation Threat, Defense One (Mar. 25, 2020).

Sydney Freedberg, Jr., No AI for Nuclear Command and Control: JAIC’s Shanahan, Breaking Defense (Sept. 25, 2019).

Tom Collina & William Perry, Who Can We Trust With the Nuclear Button? No One, The New York Times (Jun. 22, 2020).

Usha Sahay, The Human Face of Nuclear Deterrence, War on the Rocks, (Feb. 10 2021).

Vincent Boulanin, AI & Global Governance: AI and Nuclear Weapons – Promise and Perils of AI for Nuclear Stability, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, (Dec. 7, 2018). 

Scholarship & Other Research

Alfred R. Mele, Intentions, Reasons, and Beliefs: Morals of the Toxin Puzzle, 68 Philosophical Studies (1992).

Benoît Pelopidas, The unbearable lightness of luck. Three sources of overconfidence in the controllability of nuclear crises, 2 European Journal of International Security (2017).

Claire Oakes Finkelstein & Leo Katz, Contrived Defenses and Deterrent Threats: Two Facets of One Problem, 5 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law (2008).

Charles J. Moxley Jr., Unlawfulness of the United Kingdom’s Policy of Nuclear Deterrence––
Invalidity of the Scots High Court’s Decision in Zelter, Disarmament Diplomacy No. 58, (2001).

Charles J. Moxley Jr., et. al., Nuclear Weapons and Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 34 Fordham International Law Journal (2011) 595–696.

Charles J. Moxley Jr., John Burroughs & Jonathan Granoff, Nuclear Weapons and Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 34 Fordham International Law Journal (2011).

Charles Moxley Jr., John Burroughs & Jonathan Granoff, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: A Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime for the 21st Century, 34 Fordham International Law Journal (2011).

Daniel Farrell, Utility Maximization Intentions and the Theory of Rational Choice, 21 Philosophical Topics (1993).

Dakota S. Rudesill, Nuclear Command and Statutory Control, 11 Journal of National Security Law and Policy (2020).

Duncan MacIntosh, Co-operative Solutions to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Philosophical Studies (1991) 309-321.

Eric J. McFadden, The Legality of Nuclear Weapons: A Response to Corwin, 6 Penn State International Law Review (1988).

Gerald Dworkin, Nuclear Intentions, 95 Ethics (1985).

Gregory Kavka, Some Paradoxes of Deterrence, 75 The Journal of Philosophy (1978).

International Group of Experts, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, 475 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017).

Isha Jain & Bhavesh Seth, India’s Nuclear Force Doctrine: Through the Lens of Jus Ad Bellum, 32 Leiden Journal of International Law (2019) 111-129.

Jeffrey G. Lewis & Bruno Tertrais, OP #45: The Finger on the Button: The Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear-Armed States, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2019).

John Burroughs, Looking Back: The 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, Arms Control Association (2016).

John Burroughs, Remarks, Nuclear Weapons and International Law 2020, New York State Bar Association (2020).

John P. Holdren, The overwhelming case for no first use, 17 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2020) 3-7.

Jonathan Granoff, Nuclear Weapons, Ethics, Morals and Law, Brigham Young University Law Review (2000).

Jonathan Granoff, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Its 2005 Review Conference: A Legal and Political Analysis, International Law and Politics (2007).

Karlyn Kohrs Campbell & Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Rhetoric and Presidential Politics, M. J. MacDonald ed., Oxford University Press (2014).

Kevin Chilton & Greg Weaver, Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, Strategic Studies Quarterly (2009).

Kevin Govern, National Solutions to an International Scourge: Prosecuting Piracy Domestically as a Viable Alternative to International Tribunals, 19 University of Miami International & Comparative Law Review (2011).

Lawrence Alexander, The Doomsday Machine: Proportionality, Punishment and Prevention, 63 The Monist (1980).

Matthew Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form and Substance of the U.N. Charter Regime, 24 The European Journal of International Law (2013).

Matthew Waxman, The Power to Threaten War, The Yale Law Journal (2013).

Michael Dummett, The Morality of Deterrence, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1986).

Michael T. Klare, Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation, Arms Control Association, (Nov. 2019).

Michael T. Klare, ‘Skynet’ Revisited: The Dangerous Allure of Nuclear Command Automation, Arms Control Association, (April 2020). 

Michael N. Schmitt, Peacetime Cyber Responses and Wartime Cyber Operations Under International Law: An Analytical Vade Mecum, 8 Harv. Sec. L. J. 239, 278 (2017).

Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 Mich. J. Int’l L. 513, 535 (2003).

Michael N. Schmitt & Maj. Michael Schauss, Uncertainty in the Law of Targeting: Towards a Cognitive Framework, 10 Harv. Sec. L. J. 148, 174 (2019).

Nuclear Weapons Under International Law: An Overview, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (Oct. 2014).

Paul Robinson & John Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2004).

Randall Dipert, Preventive War and the Epistemological Dimension of the Morality of War, 5 Journal of Military Ethics (2006).

Scott D. Sagan and Allen S. Weiner, The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine, International Security 2021; 45 (4): 126–166. 

Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, 1 Philosophy & Public Affairs (1972) 123-144.

Contact us

For any questions regarding the conference or registration, please contact: Jennifer Cohen at jenn.cohen@appc.upenn.edu

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Left of Launch: Communications and Threat Escalation in a Nuclear Age