CENTER FOR ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW​

North Korea: Bargaining in the Shadow of Armed Conflict

October 17 -
 17, 2017

This event is co-sponsored by the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics, the James Joo-Jin Kim Program in Korean Studies, and the Center for East Asian Studies, each at the University of Pennsylvania.

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The Conference

The challenges that a nuclear North Korea poses to its neighbors, the U.S. and the global community have constituted headline news for the past two decades. Ever since the country withdrew from the Six-Party Talks in 2009, its efforts to develop nuclear weapons have greatly intensified. They have led to the country being subjected to increasingly tough bilateral and multilateral sanctions. Nevertheless, North Korea’s historic commitment to the Kim family’s ideology of juche, or “self-reliance,” has emboldened the country’s diplomatic, financial, and military autarky, heightened its resistance to normal engagment with other states, and reduced the prospect of a negotiated solution.  

As of May 2017 the “hermit kingdom” had conducted five underground nuclear tests and was believed to possess between 13 and 30 nuclear weapons. It also has a rapidly advancing delivery capability that threatens the immediate region as well as the U.S. mainland. Over the past six months the crisis has escalated dramatically, with North Korea repeatedly testing ballistic missiles. This has sparked intense public and policy debate about the options for dealing with the threat. The debate has focused mainly on the strategies of military action, additional sanctions and U.S. pressure on China in order to get China to put pressure on North Korea. Insufficient attention has been paid to the option of negotiations.

CERL is aware that negotiations with North Korea have been unsuccessful historically and does not advocate that negotiations at this point in time are necessarily feasible or appropriate. Rather, we maintain that negotiations should be taken seriously since there may well be no other viable approach. There is an evident risk that coercive measures and threats will be counter-productive, heightening rather than de-escalating tension. Consequently, the option of negotiations, and the relationship between negotiations and coercive strategies, should be the subject of well-reasoned debate.

The CERL symposium will contribute to informed policy and public discussion on the North Korea crisis by examining the potential for, and obstacles to, negotiations with that country as a means to resolving or at least managing the crisis.

The symposium will have two consecutive panel discussions followed by a keynote speaker. All the speakers are experts on North Korea and reflect a balance of senior scholars, policy experts, former diplomats, and security practitioners. Their perspectives and interactions will enrich public and policy discussion on what is arguably the most severe contemporary international crisis.

The first panel will address the overarching question of whether the U.S. should engage in negotiations with North Korea. On the one hand, negotiations might help legitimize the North Korean government and reward it for having unlawfully developed nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Negotiations might also undermine international efforts to deter the development of nuclear weapons elsewhere. On the other hand, the North Korea crisis is so severe and the nuclear stakes are so high that the U.S. may have little or no responsible choice but to pursue a negotiated arrangement. If the U.S. chooses not to engage in negotiations, what are its alternative strategies and are they likely to succeed? If negotiations did take place, what would be their goal: containment of the nuclear threat or restoration of full diplomatic relations? 

The second panel will explore the dynamics of negotiations with North Korea if the U.S. decides to adopt this strategy. Are there any pre-conditions that should be met before negotiations commence? Would sanctions and threats of military force encourage or discourage negotiations? Which countries should participate in the negotiations? Should there be a third-party mediator? How should the United Nations be involved? What should the goals be and what kind of concessions should the U.S. be willing to make in order to attain those goals? How does North Korea view negotiations and how does it view the U.S.? And what can be learned from the negotiations on the Iran nuclear program?

Schedule

October 11, 2017

Location: Perry World House, University of Pennsylvania

1:00 – 1:15 pm Welcoming Remarks:
William Burke-White, Richard Perry Professor and Inaugural Director, Perry World House; Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School Claire Finkelstein, Co-founder and Faculty Director, CERL; Algernon Biddle Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania

1:15 – 2:45 pm Panel 1: Should the United States enter into negotiations with North Korea to resolve its ongoing conflict?

This panel will address the overarching question of whether the U.S. should engage in negotiations with North Korea. On the one hand, negotiations might help legitimize the North Korean government and reward it for having unlawfully developed nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Negotiations might also undermine international efforts to deter the development of nuclear weapons elsewhere. On the other hand, the North Korea crisis is so severe and the nuclear stakes are so high that the U.S. may have little or no responsible choice but to pursue a negotiated arrangement. If the U.S. chooses not to engage in negotiations, what are its alternative strategies and are they likely to succeed? If negotiations did take place, what would be their goal: containment of the nuclear threat or restoration of full diplomatic relations? 

Moderator:  Professor Jacques deLisle, Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law & Professor of Political Science; Director, Center for East Asian Studies, University of Pennsylvania Law School

Panelists:
 
Professor Bridget Coggins, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara
Ms. Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association
Dr. Robert Litwak, Vice President for Scholars and Director of International Security Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Dr. Leon Sigal, Director, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project, Social Science Research Council

2:45 – 3:00 pm Break 

3:00 – 4:30 pm Panel 2: Were the United States to enter into negotiations with North Korea, which strategies and tools would be most effective?

This panel will explore the dynamics of negotiations with North Korea if the U.S. decides to adopt this strategy. Are there any pre-conditions that should be met before negotiations commence? Would sanctions and threats of military force encourage or discourage negotiations? Which countries should participate in the negotiations? Should there be a third-party mediator? How should the United Nations be involved? What should the goals be and what kind of concessions should the U.S. be willing to make in order to attain those goals? How does North Korea view negotiations and how does it view the U.S.? And what can be learned from the negotiations on the Iran nuclear program?   

Moderator:  Professor Laurence Nathan,Advisor, Oxford Research Group Sustainable Security Programme; Director of the Centre for Mediation in Africa, University of Pretoria; Visiting Professor, Cranfield University

Panelists:

Professor Eileen Babbitt,Director of the Institute for Human Security and Professor of Practice of International Conflict Analysis and Resolution, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
Professor Antonia Chayes, Professor of Practice of International Politics and Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, Former Special Envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea
Ms. Suzanne DiMaggio, Director and Senior Fellow, New America
Ambassador Mark Lippert, Former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea

4:30 – 5:00 pm Break 

5:00 – 6:30 pm Keynote Program

This portion of the symposium will consist of brief remarks by the keynote presenters, followed by a moderated conversation between them that addresses issues implicated in the foregoing panels, which in turn, will be followed by questions from the audience.

Governor Bill Richardson, Former Governor of New Mexico; former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations; former U.S. Member of Congress; former U.S. Secretary of Energy

Mr. David Sanger, Chief Washington Correspondent, The New York Times

Moderator: Professor Claire Finkelstein, Co-founder and Faculty Director, CERL; Algernon Biddle Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania

Participants

Professor Eileen Babbitt

             Director of the Institute for Human Security and Professor of Practice of International Conflict Analysis and Resolution, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University 

Professor William Burke-White

Richard Perry Professor and Inaugural Director, Perry World House; Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School

Professor Antonia Chayes

Professor of Practice of International Politics and Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Professor Bridget Coggins

Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara

Ms. Kelsey Davenport

Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association

Professor Jacques deLisle

Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law & Professor of Political Science; Director, Center for East Asian Studies, University of Pennsylvania Law School

Ambassador Joseph DeTrani

Former Special Envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea

Ms. Suzanne DiMaggio

Director and Senior Fellow, New America

Professor Claire Finkelstein

Co-founder and Faculty Director, CERL; Algernon Biddle Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania

Ambassador Mark Lippert

Former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea (2014-17)

Dr. Robert Litwak

Vice President for Scholars and Director of International Security Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Professor Laurie Nathan

Advisor, Oxford Research Group Sustainable Security Programme; Director of the Centre for Mediation in Africa, University of Pretoria; Visiting Professor, Cranfield University

Governor Bill Richardson

Former Governor of New Mexico, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, former U.S. Member of Congress, former U.S. Secretary of Energy

Mr. David Sanger

Chief Washington Correspondent, The New York Times

Dr. Leon Sigal

Director, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project, Social Science Research Council

Background Readings

Panel 1:  Should the United States enter into negotiations with North Korea to resolve its ongoing conflict?

Allison, Graham, “The North Korean Threat Beyond ICBMs,” The Atlantic, Aug. 28, 2017, at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/north-korea-nuclear-kim-obama-china/538194/.

Andre, Paul. “Can North Korea Follow the ‘Chinese Way?’ The Tricky Case of Constitutionalizing a Socialist Regime.” Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 53-84. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/23757898. Accessed 1 June 2017

Cargill, Thomas F., and Elliott Parker. “Economic Reform and Alternatives for North Korea.” The Survival of North Korea: Essays on Strategy, Economics, and International Relations, edited by Kim, Suk Hi, et al., McFarland & Co., 2011, pp. 99-116, www.business.unr.edu/faculty/parker/Cargill-Parker_NK_2010.pdf. Accessed 3 June 2017.  

Cathcart, Adam, and Steven Denney. “North Korea’s Cultural Diplomacy in the Early Kim Jong-un Era.” North Korean Review, vol. 9, no. 2, 2013, pp. 29-42. White Rose Research Onlineeprints.whiterose.ac.uk/80373/. Accessed 9 June 2017.

Chanlett-Avery, Emma, Ian E. Rinehart, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin. “North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation.” Congressional Research Service, 15 Jan. 2016. ProQuest Congressionalcongressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t21.d22.crs-2016-fdt-0041?accountid=14707. Accessed 14 June 2017.

Clemens, Walter C., Jr. “North Korea: What Options Remain?” The Diplomat, 19 Sept. 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/09/north-korea-what-options-remain/. Accessed 7 June 2017.

—-.”The Role of Culture in Negotiations with the North.” The Journal of East Asian Affairs vol. 19, no. 2, 2005, pp. 43-66. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/23257916. Accessed 21 June 2017.

Cohen, Roberta. “Human Rights and Humanitarian Planning for Crisis in North Korea.” International Journal of Korean Studies, vol. 19, no. 2, 2015, pp. 1-25. International Council on Korean Studies, www.icks.org/html/main.php. Accessed 2 June 2017

Corrado, Jonathan, and Brian Moore. “North Korea’s Outsourced Workforce: How Defectors Slipped Through China’s Borders.” Foreign Affairs, 9 June 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-06-09/north-koreas-outsourced-workforce.

Einhorn, Robert. “Should America Reengage with North Korea?” Brookings Institution, 3 July 2014, www.brookings.edu/opinions/should-america-reengage-with-north-korea/. Accessed 5 July 2017.

Fifield, Anna. “Dennis Rodman is back in North Korea. Was he sent by Trump?” The Washington Post, 13 June 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/world/dennis-rodman-is-on-his-way-to-north-korea-was-he-sent-by-trump/2017/06/12/5c9c19cc-4fd9-11e7-a973-3dae94ed3eb7_story.html?utm_term=.8e0ab5d8820e. Accessed 10 July 2017.

Garside, Juliette and Luke Harding.  “British banker set up firm ‘used by North Korea to sell weapons’”  The Guardian, 4 April 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/04/panama-papers-briton-set-up-firm-allegedly-used-by-north-korea-weapons-sales

—-. “What does Kim Jong Un want with all these missile tests? Talks, perhaps?” The Washington Post, 8 June 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/what-does-kim-jong-un-want-with-all-these-missile-tests-talks-perhaps/2017/06/08/85125afe-49cd-11e7-b69d-c158df3149e9_story.html?utm_term=.e3a820d31e12. Accessed 10 July 2017.

Ha, Yong Chool, and Chaesung Chun. “North Korea’s Brinkmanship and the Task to Solve the “Nuclear Dilemma”.” Asian Perspective, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 87–109. JSTORwww.jstor.org/stable/42704703.

Haggard, Stephan. “Negotiating a Korean Settlement: The Role of Sanctions.” KoreaObserver, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 939-961. Institute of Korean Studieshttp://www.iks.or.kr/rankup_module/rankup_board/attach/vol47no4/14833218246594.pdf.

Hecker, Siegfried. “The U.S. Must Talk to North Korea.” New York Times, 12 January 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/opinion/the-us-must-talk-to-north-korea.html?_r=0.

Hudson, John and David Francis. “Why Did Sanctions Fail Against North Korea?” Foreign 
Policy, 9 September 2016, www.foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/09/why-did-sanctions-fail-against-north-korea/. Accessed 8 June 2017.

Jung, Seung-Ho. “Effects of Economic Sanctions on North Korea-China Trade: A Dynamic Panel Analysis.” Seoul Journal of Economics, vol. 29, no. 4, 2016, pp. 481-503. SSRNhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2878409.

Kim, Bomi. “North Korea’s Siege Mentality: A Sociopolitical Analysis of the Kim Jong-un Regime’s Foreign Policies.” Asian Perspective, vol. 40, 2016, pp. 223-244. Lynne Reinner Publishershttp://journals.rienner.com/doi/pdf/10.5555/0258-9184-40.2.223?code=lrpi-site.

Kim, Jin A. “UN Sanctions as an Instrument of Coercive Diplomacy Against North Korea.” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 26, no. 3, 2014, pp. 315-332. Korean Studies Information Service Systemhttp://kiss.kstudy.com/journal/thesis_name.asp?tname=kiss2002&key=3261263

Kim, Rakhyun E. and Saleem H. Ali. “Green Diplomacy-An Opportunity for Peace-building?” Environmental Policy and Law, vol. 46, no. 1, Feb. 2016, pp. 86-96. ProQuestproxy.library.upenn.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1790608958?accountid=14707.

Krasner, Stephen. “A Least Worst Option on North Korea.” Lawfare, 15 May 2017, Lawfare Institute & Brookings Institution, www.lawfareblog.com/least-worst-option-north-korea

Lee, Jong-Woon, and Kevin Gray. “Cause for Optimism? Financial Sanctions and the Rise of the Sino-North Korean Border Economy.” Review of International Political Economy, vol. 24, no. 3, 2017, pp. 424-453. Taylor & Francis Onlinedx.doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2017.1301977.

Lee, Seung-Ook. “A Geo-Economic Object or an Object of Geo-Political Absorption? Competing Visions of North Korea in South Korean Politics.” Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 45, no. 4, 2015, pp. 693-714. Taylor & Francis Onlinedx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2015.1023333.

Luhn, Alec. “Russia Wants North Korea’s Money, Not Its Refugees.” Foreign Policy, 25 January 2017, foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/25/russia-wants-north-koreas-money-not-its-refugees/.

Lynch, Colum. “Confidential U.N. Report Details North Korea’s Front Companies in China.” Foreign Policy, 28 February 2017, foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/28/confidential-u-n-report-details-north-koreas-front-companies-in-china/.

McNamara, Luke.  “Why is North Korea So Interested in Bitcoin?”  Threat Research Blogwww.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/north-korea-interested-in-bitcoin.html.  Accessed 13 September 2017.

Moon, Katharine H.S. and Paul Park. “Are Sanctions Enough to Deal with North Korea?” Web log post. Order From Chaos. Brookings Institute, 2 March 2016, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/03/02/are-sanctions-enough-to-deal-with-north-korea/.

Mullen, Mike, et al. A Sharper Choice on North Korea: Engaging China for a Stable Northeast Asia. Council on Foreign Relations, 2016. www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2016/09/TFR74_North%20Korea.pdf.

Park, Young Ho. “South and North Korea’s Views on the Unification of the Korean Peninsula and Inter-Korean Relations.” Brookings Institution, 2014, www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Park-Young-Ho-paper.pdf.

Reilly, James. “The Curious Case of China’s Aid to North Korea.” Asian Survey, vol. 54, no. 6, 2014, pp. 1158-1183. University of California Press, dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2014.54.6.1158. Accessed 3 June 2017.

Sanger, David E. and William J. Broad. “North Korea’s Missile Success is Linked to Ukrainian Plant, Investigators Say.” The New York Times, 14 Aug. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/world/asia/north-korea-missiles-ukraine-factory.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Sanger, David E. “Trump Reminded Threats Work Differently in Diplomacy than in Real Estate.” The New York Times, 16 Aug. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/world/asia/trump-korea-iran-venezuela.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Sanger, David E. “Talk of ‘Preventive War’ Rises in White House over North Korea.” The New York Times, 20 Aug. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/20/world/asia/north-korea-war-trump.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Sanger, David E. “Trump Forges Ahead on Costly Nuclear Overhaul.” The New York Times, 27 Aug. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/27/us/politics/trump-nuclear-overhaul.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Sanger, David E. “North Korea Fires Missile Over Japan.” The New York Times, 28 Aug. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/world/asia/north-korea-missile.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Sanger, David E. “How the U.S. Could Respond to Another North Korean Missile Test.” The New York Times, 7 Sept. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/world/asia/north-korea-missile-test-us-options.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Sanger, David E. and Choe Sang-Hun. “North Korea Launches another Missile, Escalating Crisis.” The New York Times, 14 Sept. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/world/asia/north-korea-missile.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Sanger, David E. and William J. Broad. “The Rare, Potent Fuel Powering North Korea’s Weapons.” The New York Times, 17 Sept. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/17/world/asia/north-korea-rocket-fuel-missiles.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Sanger, David E. “The Contradiction Buried in Trump’s Iran and North Korea Policies.” The New York Times, 20 Sept. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/20/world/asia/trump-iran-north-korea-.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Sanger, David E. “In Tillerson’s China Stop, Questions on North Korea but Slim Chance of Clarity.” The New York Times, 29 Sept. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/29/world/asia/rex-tillerson-china-north-korea.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Snyder, Scott. Negotiating on the Edge. United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999.

Talmadge, Eric.  “Pyongyang challenge: Should US shoot Kim’s missiles down?”  Associated Press, 11 August 2017, https://apnews.com/839865501c6e4d8084c5f5258fb7f656/Pyongyang-challenge:-Should-US-shoot-Kim’s-missiles-down.

Tan, Pearly. “Russia Agrees Deal to Slash North Korean Debt by 90%.” Time, 20 April 2014, time.com/69790/russia-agrees-deal-to-slash-north-korean-debt-by-90/.

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Warrick, Joby. “A North Korean Ship was Seized off Egypt with a Huge Cache of Weapons Destined for a Surprising Buyer.” The Washington Post, 1 Oct. 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-north-korean-ship-was-seized-off-egypt-with-a-huge-cache-of-weapons-destined-for-a-surprising-buyer/2017/10/01/d9a4e06e-a46d-11e7-b14f-f41773cd5a14_story.html?undefined=&utm_term=.c61e31
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Wu, Anne. “What China Whispers to North Korea.” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, March 2005, pp. 35-48. Project Musedx.doi.org/10.1162/0163660053295239.

Wright, Robin.  “What Would War with North Korean Look Like?”  The New Yorker, 6 September 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-would-war-with-north-korea-look-like.

Yong, Soo Park. “Policies and Ideologies of the Kim Jong-un Regime in North Korea: Theoretical Implications.” Asian Studies Review, vol. 38, no. 1, 24 Dec. 2013, pp. 1-14. Taylor & Francis Onlinedx.doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2013.868864.

Zook, Darren C. “Reforming North Korea: Law, Politics, and the Market Economy.” Stanford Journal of International Law, vol. 48, 2012, pp. 131-183. University of California, Berkeleypolisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/people/u3873/Zook_NorthKorea_reform_SJIL.pdf.

PANEL 2:  Were the United States to enter into negotiations with North Korea, which strategies and tools would be most effective? 

Bar-Tal, Daniel. “From Intractable Conflict Through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis.” Political Psychology, vol. 21, no. 2, 2000, pp. 351-365. JSTORwww.jstor.org/stable/3791795?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. Accessed 29 June 2017.

Bee, Ronald J. “Sanctions and nonproliferation.” Great Decisions, 2011, pp. 73-86. JSTORwww.jstor.org/stable/43682304. Accessed 15 June 2017.

Çelik, Ayşe Betül, and Bahar Rumelili. “Necessary But Not Sufficient: The Role of the EU in Resolving Turkey’s Kurdish Question and the Greek-Turkish Conflicts.” European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 11, 2006, pp. 203-222. HeinOnlinehttp://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.kluwer/eurofa0011&collection=kluwer&id=207. Accessed 29 June 2017.

Cohen, Johnathan R. “A Genesis of Conflict: The Zero-Sum Mindset.” Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 17, no. 2, 28 Apr. 2016, pp. 427-444. SSRNdx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2771103. Accessed 14 June 2017.

Diamond, Stuart. “Public Issues.” Getting More. Crown Business, 2010, pp. 344-369.  https://www.amazon.com/Getting-More-Negotiate-Achieve-2010-12-28/dp/B008HVHB6K/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1505937099&sr=8-2&keywords=Getting+More+by+Stuart+Diamond 

Kelman, Herbert C. “The Political Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: How Can We Overcome the Barriers to a Negotiated Solution?” Political Psychology, vol. 8, no. 3 Sept. 1987, pp. 347-363. JSTORwww.jstor.org/stable/3791039. Accessed 14 June 2017.

Lavin, Andrew K. “Achieving Peace in Iraq Through Negotiations: Lessons Learned from the Northern Ireland Peace Process.” Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, vol. 24, no. 3, 2009, pp. 571-612. HeinOnlinehttp://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/ohjdpr24&collection=journals&id=577. Accessed 29 June 2017.

Mitchell, Christopher. The Nature of Intractable Conflict: Resolution in the Twenty-First Century. Springer, 2014. https://www.amazon.com/Nature-Intractable-Conflict-Resolution-Twenty-First/dp/1403945195  

Mnookin, Robert H. “When Not to Negotiate: A Negotiation Imperialist Reflects on Appropriate Limits.” University of Colorado Law Review, vol. 74, 2003, pp. 1077–1106.

Richardson, Bill. How to Sweet-Talk a Shark: Strategies and Stories from a Master Negotiator. Rodale, 2013.
https://www.amazon.com/How-Sweet-Talk-Shark-Strategies-Negotiator-ebook/dp/B00BY59074 

Rubin, Michael. “WHY ‘RESET’ FAILED: Diplomacy with Rogues Rarely Works.” World Affairs, vol. 177, no. 2, July 2014, pp. 74-81. JSTORwww.jstor.org/stable/43556205. Accessed 8 June 2017.

Sanger, David E. “U.S. Opens Door to Talks with North Korea, While Flexing Military Muscle.” The New York Times, 3 Aug. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/us/politics/tillerson-north-korea-negotiations-missile-test.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Sanger, David E. “North Korean Nuclear Test Draws U.S. Warning of ‘Massive Military Response’.” The New York Times, 3 Sept. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/03/world/asia/north-korea-tremor-possible-6th-nuclear-test.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Sanger, David E. and Motoko Rich. “Motives of North Korea’s Leader Baffle Americans and Allies”. The New York Times, 4 Sept. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/03/world/asia/north-korea-kim-jong-un.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Sanger, David E. and Choe Sang-Hun. “U.S. Urges Fuel Cutoff for North Korea, Saying it’s ‘Begging for War’.” The New York Times, 4 Sept. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/04/world/asia/north-korea-missile-test.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Sanger, David E. “U.S. Seeks U.N. Consent to Interdict North Korean Ships.” The New York Times, 6 Sept. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/world/us-un-north-korea-sanctions.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=
latest&contentPlacement=6&pgtype=collection
.

Sanger, David E. “After U.S. Compromise, Security Council Strengthens North Korea Sanctions.” The New York Times, 11 Sept. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/world/asia/us-security-council-north-korea.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

Sanger, David E. “Prospect of Atmospheric Nuclear Test by North Korea Raises Specter of Danger.” The New York Times, 22 Sept. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/world/asia/north-korea-atmospheric-nuclear-test-risks.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-e.-sanger.

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For any questions regarding the conference or registration, please contact: Jennifer Cohen at [email protected]

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North Korea: Bargaining in the Shadow of Armed Conflict