News outlets including The New York Times, NPR, and Al Jazeera recently reported President Trump authorized the CIA to conduct covert operations in Venezuela. Reporting also indicated that the United States overtly flew at least two USAF B-52 bombers near the Venezuelan coast as “a show of force.” In addition, Army Special Operations aviation flew in the southern Caribbean Sea.
This post explores the current legal framework for covert operations in Venezuela and elsewhere, how these actions are authorized, the U.S. government’s known history of authorizing covert operations, including regime change efforts, and the legal authority for the recent strikes. It also examines the relevant legal oversight questions for Congressional intelligence committees to ensure they are fully and currently informed of intelligence activities, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity, and prevent war without Congress’ approval.
Legal framework—classified, clandestine, and covert
The current standards for classifying and declassifying information were last amended in 2009, by Executive Order 13526. The president, vice president, agency heads, and any other officials designated by the president “may classify information upon a determination that the unauthorized disclosure of such information could reasonably be expected to damage national security.”
Related to but separate from classification, the term clandestine describes a methodology used for a range of sensitive intelligence and military activities—conducted under Title 50 or Title 10 U.S. Code authority—in which the activity itself, as well as U.S. sponsorship, is secret. The Congressional Research Service notes that clandestine activities are of interest because “they involve particularly sensitive sources and methods, have significant implications for U.S. foreign relations, and incur serious risk of damage to U.S. national security or loss of life in the event of exposure or compromise.”
By comparison and contrast, covert action is codified inTitle 50, U.S. Code as “an intelligence activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”
This “‘acknowledged’ covert activity” in Venezuela is an oxymoron, as the defining characteristic of covert activity is that the government’s role is not acknowledged publicly. Therefore, a government cannot “acknowledge” its own covert activity. When a government confirms a prior secret operation, it has, by definition, ceased to be covert.
How are covert actions authorized?
U.S. covert operations require executive authorization and, equally important, congressional oversight. The degree of transparency and accountability remains contested.
Under the Hughes–Ryan Act, its amending Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, and subsequent intelligence laws, covert actions must be authorized by a presidential finding —known as a Memorandum of Notification (MON). That is a presidential directive, required by statute, that must be submitted to designated congressional committees to authorize CIA covert operations. Congressional oversight is provided primarily through the Select Committees on Intelligence, which are to be kept “fully and currently informed” by the president of such activities, with extensive accountability for intelligence activities. In “extraordinary circumstances,” the president may restrict covert action briefings to a bipartisan group of eight congressional leaders, the so-called “Gang of Eight.”
Historical examples of U.S. covert regime change efforts
It has been said “a coup d’état is a ‘sharp, clear event, easy to date and (if successful) possible to document.’” Current events between the United States and Venezuela indicate the potential for such “a sudden decisive exercise of force in politics, especially the violent overthrow or alteration of an existing government.”
Historically, during the Cold War, the United States entered a prolonged geopolitical rivalry with the Soviet Union. This era saw a series of covert interventions aimed at curbing communist influence and promoting U.S. strategic interests. U.S. intelligence agencies played a significant role in regime changes abroad. According to one study, the U.S. performed 81 overt and covert known interventions in foreign elections from 1946 to 2000. Another study documented 64 covert and six overt attempts at regime change as the United States expanded its actions beyond the traditional areas of operation—Central America and the Caribbean.
Significant operations included, but were not limited to: Operation Ajax, the 1953 Iranian coup d’état; Operation PBSuccess in Guatemala in 1954; Operation Mongoose, the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion targeting Cuba; RDZED weapons support to dissidents to assassinate President Trujillo, the authoritarian leader of the Dominican Republic; Operation Brother Sam’s material support and backing to overthrow President Goulart in the 1964 military coup in Brazil; support for the 1965 overthrow of Sukarno by General Suharto in Indonesia, and; Project FUBELT to overthrow President Allende in Chile. In addition, the United States has intervened in the national elections of countries including: Italy in 1948; the Philippines in 1953; Japan in the 1950s and 1960s; Lebanon in 1957, Project Democracy’s arming so-called contras against the leftist Sandinista government of Nicaragua in the 1980s; and intervention in Yeltsin’s reelection campaign in Russia in 1996.
Unlike covert operations, Operation Just Cause was a large-scale, overt military intervention in Panama in 1989. It involved over 27,000 troops to install the Endara government and conduct the rendition of General Noriega. While some intelligence-gathering efforts were sensitive, such as the clandestine ACID GAMBIT rescue mission, the broader Blue Spoon/Just Cause plan remained classified until its execution.
Legal and political justification for recent developments in Venezuela
Last year, the Associated Press reported that the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration sent undercover operatives into Venezuela to record and build drug-trafficking cases against the country’s leadership in “Operation Money Badger.” Since September 2025, the U.S. military has conducted at least five lethal strikes against vessels off the Venezuelan coast, resulting in 27 reported fatalities. The most recent, on October 14, 2025, killed six individuals, and then on October 17, 2025, a “drug submarine” was struck. Two survivors were repatriated to their nations without facing terrorism charges of material support of a foreign terrorist organization or narcoterrorism. These actions have drawn scrutiny from legal experts, including a member of the CERL Advisory Council and Human Rights Watch, who argue that such strikes violate principles of proportionality and sovereignty under international law. The United States is not a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, but the U.S. military’s legal advisors have previously said that the United States should “act in a manner consistent with its provisions.”
Trump has confirmed he authorized the CIA to take action in Venezuela, but no acknowledgement has been issued from the CIA nor from Congress. Countries can resort to force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter when under attack and deploying their military in self-defense. The State Department designated the Tren de Aragua cartel as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and Trump alleges that the cartel engages in irregular warfare in an “invasion” against the United States and invoked the Alien Enemies Act of 1798. Although the president cited drug trafficking and border security as reasons, the action coincides with efforts to remove Venezuelan President Maduro, raising concerns among critics about a potential regime change. Critics, including Venezuela’s government and some U.S. politicians, expressed concern that the operations could further escalate. Coups are, by their nature, a bypass of legal and constitutional procedures for changing leadership, and may involve illegal acts that undermine the rule of law, such as ignoring court orders, dismissing constitutional rules, or asserting powers not granted by the Constitution. International law does not necessarily prohibit a coup d’état carried out by internal forces against a state’s own government, because international law has traditionally viewed a state’s internal political processes, including the manner in which power is transferred, as a domestic matter of state sovereignty. A coup d’état orchestrated from without, under the meaning of the law of international responsibility, may violate fundamental human rights, particularly the right to political participation and the right to a government established by the free will of the people. By contrast, the global commitment to prevent mass atrocities like genocide and war crimes could lead to external interventions under responsibility to protect (R2P), which themselves may challenge notions of state sovereignty. No single U.S. law directly criminalizes a government’s plot to overthrow another country’s government, compared to private citizens engaging in acts of foreign interference under the 1794 Neutrality Acts and the 1799 Logan Act. However, a combination of statutes and regulations can be used to prosecute individuals involved in such conspiracies and to proscribe support for foreign coups.
Conclusion and recommendations
In 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell cautioned President George W. Bush and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that a military intervention would make the United States responsible for governing Iraq after removing Saddam Hussein’s regime. The so-called “Pottery Barn rule,” “you break it, you own it,” was first used in this context by New York Times opinion columnist and author Thomas Friedman. He noted that this effort could tie up a significant portion of the U.S. military for years and dominate the political landscape.
Operations on Venezuelan soil and in its waters may put the Pottery Barn rule into practice. The Trump administration has already conducted lethal strikes ostensibly for drug interdiction, combating migration of Tren de Aragua gang members, and is now considering potential land strikes inside Venezuela. Escalation to armed conflict with, and regime change efforts in, Venezuela will have no guaranteed outcome. While Venezuela is tremendously impoverished as a nation, President Nicolás Maduro’s Sept. 30 state of external emergency arrays a military on full wartime alert, equipped with Russian air defenses and anti-ship missiles, backed by what he claims is a militia of over 8 million armed civilian colectivos members that would make U.S. intervention a complex and volatile insurgency conflict unlike the American experience in, and established doctrine for, Iraq and Afghanistan. A humanitarian crisis of staggering conditions, along with unprecedented mass migration may well result. Strikes on Venezuela could impact not just energy export from the nation with the world’s largest proven oil reserves, but also international cooperation and commercial activity with Latin American and European allies.
Members of Congress are voicing increasing concern regarding the administration’s lack of transparency surrounding these military strikes and covert operations. Legislators report that they have not been provided with adequate evidence concerning the intended targets or the intelligence used to justify the use of lethal force. On Friday, October 17, a bipartisan group of senators said they would force a vote to block the Trump administration from attacking Venezuela, after Senate Republicans narrowly defeated a similar effort in the preceding week. Senator Kaine (D-Virginia), who is leading the effort alongside Senator Paul (R-Kentucky) and Senator Schiff (D-California), said “[t]he pace of the announcements about the authorization of covert activities and the military planning makes me think there is some chance this could be imminent.” Senator Young (R-Indiana) cautioned the measure was too broad and could be applied to military action in other regions of the world: “Despite my opposition to this resolution, I am highly concerned about the legality of recent strikes … and the trajectory of military operations without congressional approval or debate and the support of the American people.”
Congressional oversight bodies, logically ought to convene hearings and initiate inquiries. These proceedings will assess whether the operations are consistent with statutory requirements governing covert activities and the authorized use of military force. They would also do well to recall the foundational 1820 U.S. v. Smith case which affirmed the scope of Congress’ constructional power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, as found in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 20 of the Constitution, and whether captured individuals should face terrorism charges and Venezuela further sanctions. The House has also an opportunity to address this issue as it is currently reviewing the Fiscal Year 2026 budget, which includes $50 million for democracy programs in Venezuela—potentially alongside undisclosed funding for covert activities.
The legality, ethics, and effectiveness of actions involving Venezuela remain subjects of debate and controversy both domestically and internationally. While the recently restored Department of War’s ethos might well be summed up in George Washington’s wisdom that “[t]o be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace,” the U.S. can avoid war and deter threats by engaging in diplomacy, strengthening alliances, and moderating and stabilizing competition.
Kevin H. Govern is the Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Law at the Ave Maria School of Law. His full bio is available here.
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